@ARTICLE{26543120_26560949_2003, 
	author = {A. Zakrevskiy and Vladislav Tokarev}, 
	keywords = {, state budget, taxpayers, tax ratethe implementation of penalties},
	title = {<p class="text">Optimal Allocation of Limited Resources Between Investigation and Realization of Enforcement for Tax Evasion</p>},
	journal = {HSE Economic Journal },
	year = {2003},
	volume = {7},
	number = {4},
	pages = {441-470},
	url = {https://ej.hse.ru/en/2003-7-4/26560949.html},
	publisher = {},
	abstract = {This paper studies the optimal tax authority resource allocation between two functions: the investigation and imposing penalty of the tax evasion. For this purpose the dynamic control model of the tax evasion environment is built. It has three phase coordinates: total amount of income for non-investigated tax evasion cases, amount for investigated ones for which penalty is not imposed yet and amount of funds returned into state budget as a result as a result of investigation and penalty of tax evasion. Based on theoretical plausible hypothesizes about tendency of tax&shy;payers to the tax evasion and efficiency of tax authority's work the set of differen&shy;tial equations is presented.&nbsp;The task for finding minimum of the total amount of non-investigated and not yet fined evasions is set and resolved on the basis of Pontryagin's Maximum Princi&shy;ple. The question of the practical realization of solutions based on deterministic ap&shy;proximation is considered.},
	annote = {This paper studies the optimal tax authority resource allocation between two functions: the investigation and imposing penalty of the tax evasion. For this purpose the dynamic control model of the tax evasion environment is built. It has three phase coordinates: total amount of income for non-investigated tax evasion cases, amount for investigated ones for which penalty is not imposed yet and amount of funds returned into state budget as a result as a result of investigation and penalty of tax evasion. Based on theoretical plausible hypothesizes about tendency of tax&shy;payers to the tax evasion and efficiency of tax authority's work the set of differen&shy;tial equations is presented.&nbsp;The task for finding minimum of the total amount of non-investigated and not yet fined evasions is set and resolved on the basis of Pontryagin's Maximum Princi&shy;ple. The question of the practical realization of solutions based on deterministic ap&shy;proximation is considered.}
}