@ARTICLE{26543120_64134468_2012, 
	author = {Evgeny Zhelobodko and Sergey Kokovin and Maria Sablina}, 
	keywords = {, price discrimination, screening, Spence-Mirrlees conditiontwo-part tariff},
	title = {The Comparative Advantages of Two Price Discrimination Schemes for Two Types of Consumers with Non-ordered Demands},
	journal = {HSE Economic Journal },
	year = {2012},
	volume = {16},
	number = {2},
	pages = {243-263},
	url = {https://ej.hse.ru/en/2012-16-2/64134468.html},
	publisher = {},
	abstract = {A monopolist can price-discriminate between two consumer groups with linear de mands that can cross (violate the Spence-Mirrlees condition). We derive complete parametric taxon omy of the outcomes. Switching from simple uniform pricing to two-part tariff or package pricing «generally» decreases the monopolistic deadweight loss. Switching from two-part tariff to packages also «generally» decreases the loss. However, we specify a small parameters' region where both these conclusions fail. Additionally, we find parameters yielding discrimination bene fits to «big» or to «small» consumers. Thereby, we show the demand-specific and pricing- scheme specific reasons for/against public restrictions on price discrimination.},
	annote = {A monopolist can price-discriminate between two consumer groups with linear de mands that can cross (violate the Spence-Mirrlees condition). We derive complete parametric taxon omy of the outcomes. Switching from simple uniform pricing to two-part tariff or package pricing «generally» decreases the monopolistic deadweight loss. Switching from two-part tariff to packages also «generally» decreases the loss. However, we specify a small parameters' region where both these conclusions fail. Additionally, we find parameters yielding discrimination bene fits to «big» or to «small» consumers. Thereby, we show the demand-specific and pricing- scheme specific reasons for/against public restrictions on price discrimination.}
}