TY  - JOUR
TI  - The Comparative Advantages of Two Price Discrimination Schemes for Two Types of Consumers with Non-ordered Demands
T2  - HSE Economic Journal 
IS  - HSE Economic Journal 
KW  - price discrimination
KW  - screening
KW  - Spence-Mirrlees condition
KW  - two-part tariff
AB  - A monopolist can price-discriminate between two consumer groups with linear de mands that can cross (violate the Spence-Mirrlees condition). We derive complete parametric taxon omy of the outcomes. Switching from simple uniform pricing to two-part tariff or package pricing «generally» decreases the monopolistic deadweight loss. Switching from two-part tariff to packages also «generally» decreases the loss. However, we specify a small parameters' region where both these conclusions fail. Additionally, we find parameters yielding discrimination bene fits to «big» or to «small» consumers. Thereby, we show the demand-specific and pricing- scheme specific reasons for/against public restrictions on price discrimination.
AU  - Evgeny Zhelobodko
AU  - Sergey Kokovin
AU  - Maria Sablina
UR  - https://ej.hse.ru/en/2012-16-2/64134468.html
PY  - 2012
SP  - 243-263
VL  - 16