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Anne Perrot

Quality Signalling by Banks on the Savings Market

1999. Vol. 3. No. 2. P. 211–225 [issue contents]
One of the major issues concerning the dysfunction of the credit market is that of the information available to consumers on the quality of the good offered by the supplier. In the case of the saving market, when a consumer wants to make a deposit at a bank, the main risk he faces is that of bankruptcy of this bank. When bankruptcy occurs, the consumer may loose the whole amount of his deposit, and in turn this may prevent him from going to any bank. This type of situation is quite similar to that described by Akerlof (1970), where, due to the uncertainty on the product quality faced by buyers, the market can disappear.
Citation: Perrot A. (1999) Quality Signalling by Banks on the Savings Market [Quality Signalling by Banks on the Savings Market]. HSE Economic Journal , vol. 3, no 2, pp. 211-225 (in Russian)
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