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557–589
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With the data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) for 2000–2004 the authors estimate the probabilities of employment in the public sector for various demographic, occupational, and territorial population subgroups. The paper also provides wage gap estimates for all these groups applying switching regression and fixed effects model that correct for endogeneity of the sector selection. As it is shown, the chances to be employed in the public sector are higher for rural residents and those who live in less developed regions. There is significant cross-group variation in the wage gap. Decomposition of the wage gap proves that centralized bureaucratic wage-setting pulls down wages in the public sector while market forces work to compensate for the underpay. |
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590–619
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The paper analyses gender wage gap in Russia using micro-data of the NOBUShousehold survey carried out by the Rosstat in 2003. The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of differences in average monthly wages between men and women generally confirms previous findings obtained using the RLMS data. Firstly, the asymmetric gender employment structure is the main contributor to the male-female wage gap. Secondly, both the level and the returns to accumulated human capital for women are on average higher than for men, narrowing the wage gap. Thirdly, about a half of the observed differential cannot be explained using standard decomposition framework. The unexplained gender wage differential is a proxy for an estimate of the level of discrimination and constitutes about 15–18% of the average wage of men. The implemented analysis of distribution of the unexplained gender wage gap across subgroups of workers indicates that the certain part of this gap can be explained indeed by the discrimination of women. The paper also presents an indirect evidence of «the glass ceiling» for Russian women. |
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620–637
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By now experimental economists have accumulated a vast array of data indicating that human behavior in certain experiments systematically refutes the core self-interest hypothesis of microeconomics, but can be instead explained by fairness and reciprocity concerns. This paper gives an overview of the theories and models developed to explain and predict such behavior, and assesses the relative strengths and weaknesses of various existing approaches. |
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638–669
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In previous number of the journal eight lectures from a course «Introduction to econometric analysis of panel data» has been published. Its have presented a general information on the panel data, the basic models estimations methods, estimators property and specification tests. Then there were discussed the estimation problems under conditions of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the error term, correlation between some of the explanatory variables and the individual effects and the estimation problems, which take place in dynamic models and models with measurement errors. In this publication two last lectures are offered your attention. The first one considers estimation of the models with qualitative and limited dependent variables. The second one will be discussed some measures for sample attrition consequences decreasing. |
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