We study the market discipline by retail depositors of the foreign bank subsidiaries in Russia. We analyze the effect of the direct signal about the bank’s foreign origin – the bank’s title – to deposit growth (quantitative discipline) and interest rates (price discipline) sensitivity to the bank riskiness. We assume that the banks having direct indication of the fact that the owner is a foreign financial company in the banks’ titles, will enjoy greater confidence of retail depositors and therefore less intense market discipline, and this effect will remain unchanged in the crisis of 2008–2009. An alternative hypothesis originates from the consumer ethnocentrism approach, assuming that the signal of foreign ownership will provide an incentive for depositors to monitor the banks more attentively. We use data on 56 foreign banks for 2007–2015. The results suggest that if the bank’s title signals the foreign origin, the deposit growth is significantly more sensitive to a decrease in the capital adequacy ratio or in credit risk, which indicates the ethnocentrism effect, working for disciplining by both quantity and price. The effect for quantitative discipline persists during the crisis of 2008–2009, which is important due to the fact, that this period witnessed the significant inflow of deposits to state and foreign banks from national private ones. The one for price discipline, however, disappears: we witness a reduction in the intensity of price discipline during the crisis for both groups of foreign banks.