2000. vol. 4. No. 4

The article is devoted to the analysis of patterns of macroeconomic evolution of the shadow sector for transition economies of various types. For R-economies (rich natural resources, emphasis on the priority development of export-oriented extractive industries), the share of the shadow sector in GDP is steadily growing, while for L-economies (relatively poor natural resources, emphasis on the development of manufacturing industries), the parabolic dynamics of the share of the shadow sector in GDP is characteristic, which is a mirror image of the U-shaped pattern of the dynamics of aggregate output . These fundamental differences are explained by the significant role of trade and financial mediation mechanisms in R-economies: the collapse of the macroeconomic structure of the R-economy into several sectors that differ in terms of competition in the domestic and foreign markets leads to a sharp increase in transaction costs of economic exchanges and the possibility of extracting a significant margin for intermediary services. Models of the informal sector dynamics in transition economies of type R and L are based on a structuralist approach: the dynamics of the main financial indicators of enterprises in various sectors is considered, taking into account the factors of transaction costs caused by trade and financial mediation mechanisms. A formal analysis of these models allows us to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of traditional macroeconomic policy tools in the transition economies of R and L.

The article deals with the problem of illegal export of capital from Russia, formulates methodological methods for its analysis, justifies methods for assessing the scale of this phenomenon based on balance of payments data, explores and analyzes possible organizational schemes, considers international experience in studying the problem of capital flight and issues of its prevention.

Based on panel data for 1995-1997, the article examines the impact of the share capital structure on the performance of non-financial privatized enterprises in Russia that are part of the blue-chip group of the stock market. Two main questions are considered: how does the concentration of ownership affect the performance of enterprises and what is the role of different groups of owners in corporate governance.  Three indicators are used to measure firm performance: labor productivity, profitability, and Tobin Q. The study shows that the impact of ownership concentration on the performance of companies in the sample is ambiguous. In particular, there is no evidence that the concentration of ownership affects such an indicator of the efficiency of enterprises as labor productivity. The analysis of profitability and capitalization of companies allows us to raise a number of important questions about the distribution of profits among shareholders. The results show that the costs of property concentration exceed the benefits associated with it. This means that the concentration of ownership involves significant expropriation of small shareholders. Analysis of individual groups of owners shows that the presence of foreign shareholders improves the performance of enterprises, as measured by labor productivity and Tobin's Q.

Reconstruction of adequate statistics of the Soviet period was the task of numerous studies both in our country and abroad. This work contains reconstructed statistical indicators of Russian macroeconomics in 1961-1990, calculated by joint efforts of Russian and Japanese researchers with the support of the state statistics Committee of Russia and The government of Japan. The main part of the calculations was performed in 1998-2000 at Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo. Early versions of the work were partially published in Russia and abroad, and formed the basis for a number of journal articles and speeches at international conferences and seminars. Statistical data are accompanied by detailed methodological explanations and comments.

In previous lectures, we considered: the evolution of approaches to the concept of natural monopoly; issues of regulation of natural monopolies (the history of regulation, the main theories of regulation, goals and forms of regulation, evaluation criteria); the main reasons and directions of the current regulatory reform; and regulatory mechanisms (regulation of the rate of return on capital, incentive regulation (price limits, yardstick competition, price discrimination, Ramsay prices, Vogelsang - Finsinger mechanism, multi-component tariffs)). In lectures 3 and 4, using the example of two major industries - electricity and gas-we will analyze how regulatory reform is unfolding in different countries, how the traditional appearance of these sectors is changing, what models and mechanisms are the basis for the ongoing transformation, and what problems complicate the reform (lecture 4 will be published in No. 1 for 2001). Throughout the world, the electricity and gas industries are undergoing a rapid deregulatory transformation.The traditional image of industries, characterized by a monopolistic structure, extensive regulation and a high share of state ownership, is changing in the direction of a more complex and multi-faceted, and new concepts of these sectors are being formed in the process of deregulation.