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Svetlana Avdasheva1, Andrew Shastitko2, Elena Kalmychkova1
  • 1 National Research University Higher School of Economics, 20 Myasnitskaya Str., Moscow, 101000, Russian Federation
  • 2 Center for Competition and Economic regulation research of RANEPA , 82 Vernadsky av., Moscow, 117571, Russia

Economic Analysis of Russian Antitrust Policy, International Perspective

2007. Vol. 11. No. 2. P. 234–270 [issue contents]
In this issue the lecture course «An Economic Analysis of Russian Antitrust Policy in the International Perspective» is continued. The lectures devoted to the most important and difficult problem of antitrust policy, and that is collusion. The economic theory of explicit and especially tacit collusion is under analysis. Authors present the economic analysis of legal rules aimed at prevention of explicit and tacit collusion in USA, EU and Russia and assess the results of their application. Finally, new legal rules designed to prevent collusion in the new Russian law «On protection of competition» (2006) are interpreted and evaluated.
Citation: Avdasheva S., Shastitko A., Kalmychkova E. (2007) Ekonomicheskie osnovy antimonopol'noy politiki: rossiyskaya praktika v kontekste mirovogo opyta [Economic Analysis of Russian Antitrust Policy, International Perspective]. Ekonomicheskiy zhurnal VShE, vol. 11, no 2, pp. 234-270 (in Russian)
Keywords: antitrust policy; tacit collusion; cartel
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