In this paper we test some hypotheses about individual decision making under risk based on the unique Russian TV show «Sdelka?!» participants behavioral data. The show presents the game where participants are supposed to choose between guaranteed amount of money and lottery which may result in gains or losses. Participants are assumed to make decisions based on prospect theory and cumulative prospect theory including both subjective probability trans formation and reference-dependent behavior. Herewith it is assumed that reference point is dynamic so it may change through the game. In order to estimate parameters associated with participants decision making mechanism we propose econometric binary choice model based on quasi maximum likelihood method. The results suggest that contestants adapt reference point depending on the game process. Adaptation seems to be asymmetric since reference point shifts noticeably to the right in response to gains and substantially less to the left if the game goes poorly. In addition, we have found weak evidence in favor of loss aversion effect. In order to demonstrate the robustness of the results we are using various approaches to subjective proba­bilities transformation. According to Akaike information criteria econometric models incorporating probability transformation are superior to objective probability mode.