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A. Zakrevskiy1, Vladislav Tokarev2
  • 1 MIPT, 1a-1, Kerch street, Moscow, 117303, Russia
  • 2 National Research University Higher School of Economics, 20 Myasnitskaya Str., Moscow, 101000, Russian Federation

Optimal Allocation of Limited Resources Between Investigation and Realization of Enforcement for Tax Evasion

2003. Vol. 7. No. 4. P. 441–470 [issue contents]

This paper studies the optimal tax authority resource allocation between two functions: the investigation and imposing penalty of the tax evasion. For this purpose the dynamic control model of the tax evasion environment is built. It has three phase coordinates: total amount of income for non-investigated tax evasion cases, amount for investigated ones for which penalty is not imposed yet and amount of funds returned into state budget as a result as a result of investigation and penalty of tax evasion. Based on theoretical plausible hypothesizes about tendency of tax­payers to the tax evasion and efficiency of tax authority's work the set of differen­tial equations is presented. 
The task for finding minimum of the total amount of non-investigated and not yet fined evasions is set and resolved on the basis of Pontryagin's Maximum Princi­ple. The question of the practical realization of solutions based on deterministic ap­proximation is considered.

Citation: Zakrevskiy A., Tokarev V. (2003) Optimizatsiya raspredeleniya resursov mezhdu raskrytiem i nakazaniem ukloneniy ot nalogov [Optimal Allocation of Limited Resources Between Investigation and Realization of Enforcement for Tax Evasion]. HSE Economic Journal , vol. 7, no 4, pp. 441-470 (in Russian)
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